EDITORIAL

EDITORIAL
Peace in the South remains elusive
Political solutions will fail to pacify the strife-torn region without backing from a competent military

Published on December 16, 2007


Members of a civil-society organisation representing Muslim community leaders in the three southernmost provinces have put forward measures to restore peace in the restive region. The proposals, presented to the four major political parties contesting the December 23 general election there, are mostly reasonable and, if implemented by the next government, should improve the chances of reducing violence and improving people's quality of life.

The Muslim community leaders asked the Democrat, People Power, Puea Pandin and Chart Thai parties to implement administrative reform, improve the justice system, adjust school curricula, reorient economic development strategy and introduce social reform to reflect the local way of life as well as promote better understanding between locals and the rest of Thai society. The four parties agreed to follow the recommendations if they became part of the next government. After all, it cost them nothing to say 'yes' to such sensible input from the local people, most of them Muslim Thais of Malay descent.

But once the new civilian government - more likely than not a coalition of parties - takes office, it will have to deal with other players involved in finding a lasting solution for the strife-torn region, namely the armed forces, national police and the Interior Ministry, which may have their own ideas of how to deal with the situation there.

There is little doubt that the military, as promised, will hand over power to a civilian government following the election. But the big challenge for the new administration will be to persuade the military, which in the 15 months since the September 2006 coup has wielded virtually unlimited power, to cooperate with any policy to suppress the insurgency and restore law and order to pave the way for economic and social development programmes that are now on hold.

For almost four years, the armed forces have tried every conceivable measure, ranging from political efforts to win the hearts and minds of local people to different military tactics to try to quell the violence. But insurgents continue to be able to wage their campaign of terror against civilians through assassinations and bombings in public places, as well as guerrilla warfare against government forces.

In all this time, the military has not learned how to effectively conduct counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations. The occasional raids on villages and communities suspected of being infiltrated by insurgents may enable the armed forces to arrest suspects and their supporters, but usually yield little evidence to substantiate charges against them in court.

The insurgents usually carry out their attacks and then hide their weapons before blending in with the nearest civilian population, whose members either willingly abet the armed struggle against the state or are coerced into silence. There is no easy way to separate insurgents from civilians. Most of the military commanders lack combat experience and are reluctant to expose their troops, who receive little or no counter-insurgency training, to danger. The tens of thousands of troops dispatched to Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat are concentrated in urban areas, if not confined to their barracks.

Even at this late stage, when the insurgency has gone from bad to worse, there is no attempt by the armed forces to seal off the porous border with Malaysia or to establish any sort of security grid to restrict the freedom of movement of insurgents. The insurgents appear to have a free hand in choosing the time and place for ambushes of military convoys or bombings of public places.

The military's failure to establish even a semblance of law and order inspires little confidence among the people. That is why few risk endangering themselves and their families by volunteering valuable intelligence against the insurgents.

If the military has failed to show the will to engage insurgents during military rule, it will be much more difficult for the new civilian government to persuade them to fulfil their duty to bring peace to the deep South. It may be true that permanent peace can only be achieved through a political solution, but any political offer that is not backed by a strong military that knows how to do its job is doomed to fail.