Stubborn junta's 'fire and water' foreign policy stymies diplomacy

Today's General News - Wednesday December 12, 2007

ANALYSIS / BURMA

Stubborn junta's 'fire and water' foreign policy stymies diplomacy

The international community may be losing patience with the Burmese junta, but that will not help unless they can get over the military's two-pronged foreign policy first

By KYAW ZWA MOE

Burma's supreme leader Senior General Than Shwe holds ''fire'' in one hand and ''water'' in the other. Don't think the junta chief is playing martial arts, like in the Chinese movies he loves to watch.

Let's call it the junta's ''fire and water'' foreign policy.

The junta chief, who used to work in the department of psychological warfare, practises his policy by dividing his officers into two groups: ''fire,'' comprised of fiery hardliners, and ''water,'' comprised of soft-spoken officers.

It is time for everyone, especially world leaders and diplomats, to take a serious look at Burma's foreign policy, which for almost two decades has managed to manipulate whatever policies the West comes up with in trying to move the regime towards democracy and national reconciliation.

Diplomacy seems to be more crucial than ever to help solve Burma's crisis, since pro-active, violent means, including nationwide uprisings and armed struggle, have proved ineffective.

For the international community, diplomacy seems to be the only way to tackle Burma's crisis. The diplomacy route is what all countries advocate, from the West to the regime's more vocal supporters, such as China and most of its Asean neighbours.

The regime's clever ''fire and water'' tactic to fend off the diplomatic efforts of its critics was on display at the junta's press conference in the new capital Naypyidaw on Monday.

One of Gen Than Shwe's right-hand men, Brig-Gen Kyaw Hsan, the information minister, ruled out any role for detained pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi in the drafting of a new constitution of the military government, even though the international community, including China, has called for an inclusive process in writing the constitution and in national reconciliation.

''No assistance or advice from other persons is required,'' said the minister.

That was the fire.

Now, for the water.

At the same conference, the government's liaison officer, ex-Maj-Gen Aung Kyi, considered ''good in dealing with foreign diplomats'', said: ''We have made progress at the meetings,'' referring to his three meetings with Daw Suu Kyi, supposedly to discuss national reconciliation.

Such ''hard'' and ''soft'' messages are ambiguous at best and muddy up the analysis made by foreign diplomats, further confusing and blurring the idea of progress or lack of progress.

In early November when UN special envoy Ibrahim Gambari visited Burma, he was lectured to by Brig-Gen Kyaw Hsan.

The information minister told Mr Gambari: ''Your Excellency should seriously pay attention to the fact that the government and the entire people are expecting your visit to be constructive for the nation and the people. However, your previous visit did not bear fruit as we had expected.

''The presidential statement of the UN Security Council, the further sanctions of the US and EU, the sanction of Australia, etc, sowed suspicions on your efforts among some of our people.''

The statement was reported by the junta's mouthpiece newspapers. Many Burma observers, including diplomats, said the speech was ''patronising''.

The minister added, ''If you bring along the instructions of the leaders of a big power and demands of internal and external anti-government groups, it will in no way contribute towards the seeking of solutions to Myanmar's affairs. It will rather increase the existing suspicions of the people.''

On the other hand, the story was different the next day when Mr Gambari met the prime minister, General Thein Sein. According to inside sources close to the government, Gen Thein Sein spoke with a softer tone to the envoy. He invited Mr Gambari to visit again a few weeks later to continue his efforts for national reconciliation.

In retrospect, Burma's governments have frequently preferred to craft foreign policy in a bilateral way since it gained its independence from British rule in 1948. During that period, Burmese governments concentrated on neutrality and a non-aligned policy, especially during the Cold War era.

Months before forming the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in 1967, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines persuaded the then Burmese government to join the imminent grouping.

The late dictator Ne Win's government turned down the proposal, saying that Burma could not join the grouping so long as member countries allowed foreign troops to be based on their soil. The dictator especially referred to its neighbour Thailand, which allowed US military bases.

However, the succeeding military regime that deposed him in 1988 viewed its foreign policy differently after the 1990 election, when the opposition National League for Democracy party, led by detained pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi, won the elections in a landslide.

To nullify the election results, the military regime desperately tried to establish its legitimacy through the regional organisation, Asean.

Moreover, through Asean it seemed to believe that it might convince the West to recognise it. That is why it joined Asean and embraced regionalism.

Burmese governments were comfortable with Asean policies such as non-interference in member countries' internal affairs and its behind-the-scenes, hush-hush diplomatic style.

Before joining Asean in July 1997, junta chief Gen Than Shwe said at a military training course: ''There is nothing to lose by joining Asean; we will only gain from it. It will not hurt our national interests. It will not interfere in our internal affairs.''

Gen Than Shwe was quoted in a paper, Regionalism in Myanmar's Foreign Policy: Past, Present, and Future, published by the Asia Research Institute of National University of Singapore, as saying: ''Regional groupings or regionalism have become important. We can no longer stick to the 'no friend, no foe' policy. We must formulate and follow a new foreign policy of 'all friends, no foe'.''

In fact, nothing conceived to date has had a chance of defeating or changing the military junta. Diplomatic means such as international sanctions and constructive engagement have failed. The international community has never had, to this day, an effective policy to counter the junta's diplomacy.

If the international community can develop an effective policy that somehow gets China and Asean countries to put real pressure on Burma, there could be tangible progress.

Kyaw Zwa Moe is managing editor of ''The Irrawaddy'' magazine, based in Chiang Mai.

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