Objective clear, identity murky

Objective clear, identity murky.

ANALYSIS / THAI POLITICS

While the objective of the multiple bomb blasts on New Year's Eve was clearly to undermine the authority of the CNS and the government, the identity of the perpetrators remains in the shadows

By THITINAN PONGSUDHIRAK

Owing to poor intelligence and dismal forensics in the army and the police, we may never know the real culprits of Bangkok's unprecedented bomb explosions on New Year's Eve that have so far claimed three lives and injured scores of innocent bystanders. Nevertheless, far-reaching political ramifications have already emerged. The bomb blasts have undermined the legitimacy and credibility of both the military junta under the Council for National Security and its appointed interim government led by General Surayud Chulanont.

As Thailand is virtually under military rule following the CNS coup on Sept 19, the bombs in Bangkok were a slap in the face of the generals.

Having seized power by force and imposed martial law, which is still in place in most parts of the country, the CNS appears inept for its inability to maintain security and public safety in central Bangkok, where thousands of revellers were ushering in the New Year.

In the same vein, the bomb blasts have discredited the Surayud government. It had already suffered a series of policy setbacks, from the failed legalisation of the underground lottery and lenient treatment of assets belonging to the family of ousted prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, to the recent controversial exchange rate management involving capital controls to stem the baht's appreciation, the Surayud cabinet now appears embattled.

It has lost its technocratic touch, and is now facing security and safety challenges in the heart of the capital.

If the CNS is unable to provide security to Bangkok residents and the Surayud cabinet is incapable of mustering the technocratic wherewithal to steer Thailand's macro-economy smoothly forward, the merits of the coup itself must now come into question.

This coup was supposed to sideline the usurpers of Thai democracy and remedy its flaws before re-launching a stronger democratic system with a new constitution and a general election.

In view of the Bangkok bombs, the return to democratic rule seems more problematic, with a potential delay. Although they are preoccupied with shoring up their credibility, the ruling generals should come out to reassure the public that Thailand's democratic roadmap remains on course.

While the perpetrators of the bomb explosions have achieved their intended effects of destabilising the Surayud government and undermining the CNS, their identity has been a subject of wild speculation.

Two contending explanations have been proferred, putting aside pet conspiracy theories.

Fingers were quickly pointed to the southern Malay-Muslim insurgency in the immediate aftermath of the bomb attacks. The well-coordinated blasts were reminiscent of similar operations seen in the southernmost border provinces of Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat over the past three years since the separatist insurgency reappeared with growing frequency and potency. The southern insurgents may have simply expanded their areas of operation to the capital, bringing their fight to the seat of power.

But the plausibility of this explanation dissipated as hours turned into days, for several reasons. First, the Malay-Muslim insurgents have shown little indication or inclination to widen their base of operations beyond the deep South, where they have benefited from inherent advantages in language, culture, customs and terrain. Having claimed more than 1,900 lives, the violence they have inflicted at will has been confined to the southernmost border provinces.

Second, the operational, logistical, organisational and financial requirements to conduct a near-simultaneous, coordinated bombing campaign in nine Bangkok areas at their most bustling time of the year, appear beyond the current capacity of the insurgents.

They would have had to rely on a tightly-knit and extensive network of contacts, informants and operatives based in Bangkok. The potential for information leakage, betrayal, unintended exposure and discovery by government security forces is immense.

It would just be too big of a leap for the insurgents to replicate en masse what they can now perpetrate with relative ease in areas under their familiarity and influence, to alien vicinities in the capital where they do not have a natural base of support.

Finally, and most important, the insurgents have not claimed credit for the Bangkok bomb attacks. The various separatist groups comprising the southern insurgency normally do not lay claim to the violence committed in the deep South, but they do not need to. Their culpability is common knowledge. But culpability in the Bangkok bombs may be assigned to other suspected groups and individuals if the insurgents remained quiet.

That the southern insurgents would have carried out the bomb attacks in Bangkok without claiming credit for political purposes, just does not make sense.

In a process of elimination, this leaves culpability to disaffected elements whose vested interests are to destabilise the government and make a laughing stock of the CNS. Prime Minister Surayud has prematurely alluded to the political forces who lost power in the Sept 19 putsch.

This implicit accusation has been greeted by a strongly- and carefully-worded denial from Mr Thaksin, the deposed premier.

But the logic and recent pattern of political developments lend some credence to the explanation that vested interests associated with the ousted regime were behind the bombs.

First, the post-coup developments have been marked by destabilising but unidentified forces who have torched dozens of state schools all over the country. The entry of General Chavalit Yongchaiyuth, a former prime minister, into the fray as a potential next leader of the Thaksin-founded Thai Rak Thai party and his allegation (later proved unfounded) of Prime Minister Surayud's illegal train carriages at a personal mountain residential resort, thickened the plot leading to the bombs.

Concurrently, news was leaked that Gen Sonthi Boonyaratkalin, the lead coup-maker in the CNS, may have two wives in contravention of Thai law.

Just a few days before the bombs, Mr Thaksin stepped up his rhetorical offensive through his lawyer, indicating that he wants to come back to fight the charges against him. The longer he is kept out of Thailand, the more marginalised he will become.

Mr Thaksin may not have had anything to do with the Bangkok bombs, as he insisted in his people-centred handwritten letter.

His flat denial, however, should be taken with a grain of salt. Mr Thaksin has sworn many times in the past about the things that he did and did not do, and many of them turned out contrary to his claims. His chief and most memorable line was his unawareness of his and his wife's assets having been registered under the names of his driver and servant _ an insistence he made in the Constitution Court, no less. By his own doing, Mr Thaksin's words have at times been worth less than the paper they were written on.

Whatever the eventual findings behind the bomb attacks, Bangkok has now entered into an uncharted territory of instability. Threats of and actual bomb attacks may well be the norm in the weeks to come, as the political temperature rises inexorably.

Ultimately, the perpetrators' aim may be to make Thailand ungovernable and to indirectly sap the country's macro-economic well-being.

The CNS generals will want to blame many, as Bangkok comes into the grips of instability and volatility. But the ruling generals must not forget to blame themselves. They took power by force, and could have set things on a sounder footing with greater decisiveness. Their kid-glove treatment of the former regime and weak post-coup management, characterised by a lacklustre caretaker cabinet, have unwittingly facilitated the bomb blasts. Their bungled coup has come back to haunt them. Having got us into this mess, the onus is on the CNS to navigate a way out of the new, unfolding round of political crisis and confrontation.

The writer is Director of the Institute of Security and International Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University.

Bangkok Post
Thursday January 04, 2007